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1 Introduction
During the last financial crisis many governments all around the world had to
respond with expansionary fiscal policy in order to stimulate their recessive
economies. When it came to decide on how big the respective stimulus pack-
ages should be, there was no broad agreement on the size of the effect of an
increase in government consumption on economic activity, which is captured
by the so-called fiscal multiplier. A recent contribution to this debate is the
article by Ilzetzki et al. (2013). They show that the effect of government spend-
ing shocks depends on key country characteristics as for instance the degree of
development, the exchange rate regime, openness to trade and public indebted-
ness. Brinca et al. (2015) contribute to the recent literature on the effectiveness
of the fiscal multiplier by suggesting another key country characteristic, which
is wealth inequality among the population of an economy. They explain the
strong correlation between wealth inequality and the size of the fiscal multiplier
by modeling an overlapping generations model with heterogeneous agents and
calibrate it to match key characteristics of a number of OECD countries. Their
findings are consistent with the strong correlation between wealth inequality
and fiscal multipliers found in the data. Within the framework of this thesis,
I focus on another potential determinant of the size of the fiscal multiplier. I
investigate whether dynamics in international labor migration potentially influ-
ence the impact of government spending shocks on output.
Over the past couple of years, immigration became an important political issue
among the developed OECD countries. That is because net migration rates to
these countries have been rising substantially during the past decades, (Nickell,
2009). In 2014, the majority of the international migration flows into OECD
countries were work related. Thus, conditions in the host labor markets were
determinant for international migration (Arslan et al., 2014). Therefore, it is
not surprising that not only employment rates were negatively affected by the
global slowdown but also net migration rates decreased on average across OECD
countries (OECD, 2014a). Along with the relationship between economic activ-
ity in the host country and net migration flows as well as the renewed interest
in fiscal policy, I would like to find out whether differences in labor migration
dynamics theoretically lead to economically meaningful differences in the size
of the fiscal multiplier.
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This Master thesis studies the effect of disturbances in fiscal policy on the econ-
omy within a basic neoclassical framework allowing for the possibility of im-
migration and emigration in response to economic activity. I consider a real
business cycle economy that is opened to a certain extend, where migration of
labor alters the population size and constellation, the labor force as well as the
aggregate capital stock. Standard real business cycle theory generally predicts
a positive effect of an increase in government consumption on economic output.
However, the size of the fiscal multiplier, crucially depends on how households
behave after such a change in fiscal consumption. First of all, it depends on how
the increase in government consumption is financed. Within the alternative of
altering taxation schemes to finance changes in government consumption, there
are two different options. An increase in government consumption can be fi-
nanced by higher lump-sum or distortionary taxes. In the case of lump-sum
taxes, the multiplier is positive however smaller than one, since households
adjust their consumption downwards due to the negative wealth effect and in-
crease the supply of labor in order to be able to cover the higher tax expenses1.
However, when changes in government consumption are financed by a higher
distortionary tax, the fiscal multiplier is certainly below unity but could even
be below zero, depending on how much private consumption as well as invest-
ment are affected. Households decrease their labor supply due to the fact that
a current income tax lowers the return on labor. Also, private consumption
as well as investment crowd out. Thus, if private consumption and investment
are relative strongly affected by the increase in government consumption, the
multiplier becomes negative.
When it comes to investigating the effects of public spending on econonmic ac-
tivity Brinca (2006) approaches the question in an empirical way and uses a
VAR (Vector Autoregressive model approach) in a country-specific framework
for Sweden. His findings suggest that the growth rate of public investment in-
directly affects GDP through the growth rate of private investment. In other
words, growth in public investment stimulates aggregate output through private
investments. Ramey (2011) summarizes the effects of fiscal policy on macroe-
conomic aggregates, neoclassical models among others hinge fundamentally on
the effect that a change in government consumption has on the labor supply of
1The timing of tax collection does not matter since Ricardian equivalence holds. The Ri-
cardian theorem proposes that deficit finance and current taxation are equal since individuals
take into account the future taxes they have to pay (Blanchard and Fischer, 1989).
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households and how this change in labor supply translates to changes in eco-
nomic activity. Thus, the labor supply adjustments within the economy together
with labor force adjustments across economies induced by higher government
consumption and how the resulting changes in the labor market are transmitted
to affect the economy’s output leads to the formulation of my research question.
How do differences in labor mobility lead to differences in the size of the fiscal
multiplier?
By investigating the effects of a change in government consumption on economic
activity allowing for labor mobility, this thesis contributes to the theoretical field
of research on the effects of fiscal policy. The goal of my thesis is to find out
if a higher elasticity of labor mobility has a positive effect on the size of the
fiscal multiplier. I find support for this hypothesis even though it is uncertain
whether the differences are economically meaningful and therefore further re-
search is needed in order to find out if the findings could have future policy
implications.
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. After briefly discussing
empirical evidence that motivates the form how labor migration modeled, I turn
to the main contribution of my thesis: A simple dynamic general equilibrium
model that incorporates international labor migration is developed in Section
2, followed by the calibration of the economy in Section 3. In Section 4, I
analyze the results of impulse response functions of an increase in government
consumption and calculate the fiscal multipliers. Section 5 summarizes the
findings and concludes.
1.1 Motiviation and empirical evidence
The economic consequences of migration have been intensively studied through-
out the past. The impact of migration on the economy can be summarized into
three areas. Migration is found to affect labor markets, the public purse and
economic growth. According to a publication on the impact of migration on the
economy by OECD (2014b), migrants accounted for nearly 50 % of the increase
in the workforce in the U.S. and 70 % in Europe over the past ten years. When it
comes to the impact on the public purse, work-related migrants contribute more
in taxes and social contributions than they actually receive in benefits. Also,
labor migrants relative to migrants that move due to other purposes have the
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most positive impact on the public purse. The migration’s impact on economic
growth is two-fold. On one hand, migration boosts the working-age population.
On the other hand, migrants are endowed with skills that contribute to the
human capital of an economy (OECD, 2014b). The fact that migration boosts
working-age population and that migrants contribute to the human capital of
an economy are the driving sources of my thesis.
A crucial feature of the model developed below is the possibility of labor im-
migration as well as labor emigration in response to economic opportunities
(Barro and Sala-i Martin, 2004). More precisely, I assume that labor migration
depends on the performance of economic output. Thus, migrant labor arrives
during an economic expansion, when economic output lies above its long-run
trend and leaves during a recession, when output lies below its long-run trend.
The evidence on economic determinants of international migration flows is ex-
tensive. Bergheim (2008) motivates why population growth should be treated
as endogenous variable in economic models. He argues that net migration is
becoming a more important source of variation in population growth. He finds
that the decision to migrate is on one hand driven by country-specific migra-
tion policies and on the other hand by the relative economic attractiveness of
countries. In line with his arguments, Ortega and Peri (2013), Mayda (2010)
and Grogger and Hanson (2011) among others find that international migration
flows are highly responsive to income at destination. It is generally perceived
that the relative income between source and destination country matters. Thus,
if the income differential between source and destination country increases, mi-
gration is found to flow from the source country towards the economically more
prosper destination country.
Along with the support of empirical evidence on the relationship between in-
ternational migration flows and economic activity, I continue with the main
contribution of my thesis. In the following Section, a real business cycle econ-
omy extended with labor mobility that depends on economic performance, is
constructed.
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2 A real business cycle model
Within the neoclassical framework, Kydland and Prescott (1982) introduced
the real business cycle theory that explains business cycle fluctuations of a
micro-founded economy as the efficient answer to real exogenous shocks. Busi-
ness cycles are caused by optimal responses of rational agents to real shocks,
which can be fluctuations in productivity growth or fluctuations in government
consumption or consumers’ preferences (Romer, 2012). In the model economy
constructed here, a positive government consumption shock financed by an in-
crease in lump-sum taxes is analyzed by allowing for labor migration to flow
into and out of the economy.
The economy that is constructed here is drawn on the paper by Canova and
Ravn (2000) who analyze the macroeconomic effects of German unification. I
simplify their model in some sense and at the same time extend it with features
in order to be able to analyze the effects of increased government spending on
output in the presence of labor migration. I also follow Gal´ı et al. (2007) who
extend a basic neoclassical framework with rule-of-thumb households in order
to investigate the effects of government expenditures on private consumption.
Even though Gal´ı et al. (2007) do not model international labor mobility, their
model is a useful guideline for the setup of the model constructed here. This
is because they model two heterogeneous types of households as well as I in-
tend to do and also because they simulate a positive government consumption
shock in presence of these two types of households to investigate the impact on
macroeconomic variables.
Even though the model is highly stylized, it contains crucial features necessary
to analyze and understand the issue of interest. The model developed here is
a basic one-sector model with four different types of actors that focuses on one
country which allows for labor migration. It features two types of optimizing
households, a representative firm that employs all labor and uses total capital
stock to produce and a government that runs a period-by-period balanced bud-
get and finances its consumption by lump-sum taxes and distortionary income
taxes.
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2.1 Demographics
It is assumed that at time 0, native as well as migrant households populated the
economy. They arrived all at once in a manner of a land rush, where I normalize
the initial size of the total population to one (Barro and Sala-i Martin, 2004).
I assume that the two types of households differ in their degree of international
labor mobility. Native households represent the immobile type of households
while migrant households are assumed to be able to freely move between the
economy and the rest of the world. The stock of migrant households is assumed
to be influenced by economic output which implies that population growth is
not held at a constant exogenous rate but adopts in an endogenous manner
throughout time. As motivated in Section 1.1, I assume that migrant labor
arrives during an economic expansion when it is needed and promptly returns
to the country of origin when the economy is finding back to its long-run steady-
state level. However, this logic only works in the absence of labor mobility
restrictions (Mandelman and Zlate, 2012). Therefore, I assume that there is
no border enforcement that would destabilize the connection between higher
labor demand during expansion and increase in the stock of migrant households.
Equation (1) captures the effect of a deviation of actual output from its steady-
state value on the stock of migrant households, where parameter θ represents the
elasticity of migration to and from the economy with respect to output. Thus,
if θ < 1 the deviation of output from its steady-state level increases the migrant
population to a lower extent. However, if θ > 1 the opposite interpretation
holds; the migrant population is relatively more responsive than the actual
deviation of the output.
xt =
(
Yt
Y
)θ
(1)
While the stock of native households Nn is constant over time, the stock of
migrant households Nmt is a function of xt and its initial size N
m.
Nnt = N
n (2)
Nmt = xtN
m (3)
Thus, a sudden increase in economic activity leads to an unexpected expansion
of the stock of migrant households within the same period, whereas the native
stock remains unchanged. When output is eventually converging back to its
steady-state level, the stock of migrant households also converges back to its
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steady state. Since the initial population is normalized to 1, the following
relation between the two types of households can be derived as
Nm = (1−Nn) (4)
Nmt = xt(1−Nn) (5)
In steady state, xt = 1 which implies that whenever the economy is in a steady
state, the size of the population equals its initial size 1, since both stocks of
households equal their steady-state sizes. In this context, labor migrants can
be seen as a certain type of seasonal workers who on one hand immigrate when
there is need for them in the economy, and on the other hand emigrate one-
by-one when the economy is finding back to its balanced growth path. Having
specified the size of each type of household in (4) and (5) , the size of the total
population at time t can be written as
Nt = N
n +Nmt
= Nn + xt(1−Nn) (6)
This leads to the expression for the change of the total population gpt
gpt ≡
Nt+1
Nt
=
Nn + xt+1(1−Nn)
Nn + xt(1−Nn) (7)
The share of each household in the total population can be written as
γt ≡ N
n
Nt
=
Nn
Nn + xt(1−Nn) (8)
(1− γt) ≡ N
m
t
Nt
=
Nmt
Nn + xt(1−Nn) (9)
2.2 The households
There are many infinitely lived households in the economy who are either mi-
grant or native households. Each household consists of one member which is
considered not to change over time. It is assumed that migrant and native
households only differ with respect to the ability of labor mobility. Apart from
the fact that native households are immobile and migrant households are not,
both are equal in every sense. Both types are endowed with the same skill level,
have equal returns on labor as well as on capital. Furthermore, I assume that
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newcomers directly acquire the political, legal and work rights of the economy,
which rules any emerging market inefficiencies out.
Klein and Ventura (2009) and Mandelman and Zlate (2012) investigate dynamic
effects of labor movements in a two-location growth model, where physical cap-
ital moves freely across the two economies. Their models imply that migrant
households are able to move their capital between economies and also that they
are able to actually accumulate capital. I adopt their assumption and allow
newcomers to move their capital stock with them. Thus, if relatively more mi-
grant households are attracted to the economy, there will be more human as
well as more physical capital available for the firms to use for production. The
opposite holds, if relatively less migrant households are located in the economy.
Also, I assume that both household types follow a Cobb-Douglas utility function
that is monotonically transformed. As a result, utility over consumption and
leisure is additively separable and is consistent with balanced growth in the
RBC framework. Since all households within a type are identical, I consider a
representative native household as well as a representative migrant household,
for whom I solve separate utility maximization problems.
2.2.1 The representative native household
At date t, the representative native household maximizes the following expected
utility
max
{cnt ,hnt ,knt+1}
Et
∞∑
t=0
βt {log(cnt ) +A log(1− hnt )} (10)
subject to the inter-temporal budget constraint and the capital evolution equa-
tion
cnt + i
n
t = (1− τ) [wthnt +Rtknt ]− tnt
knt+1 = (1− δ)knt + int (11)
where all lower case letters denote per-capita variables. cn denotes consump-
tion and hn is hours worked. Since the time endowment is normalized to one,
such that 1 − hn = ln, where ln denotes leisure. Then, kn refers to the native
household’s capital stock, τ is a uniform tax rate on labor and capital income,
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while tt denotes lump-sum taxes. Also, β is the subjective discount factor, and
A is the preference parameter for leisure which measures the intensity of the
households’ preferences for leisure relative to consumption. Hence, if A is high,
households are willing to supply a relatively small amount of labor to obtain
consumption goods and instead prefer to consume relatively more leisure (Fehr,
1999).
The native household’s Euler equation and the optimal labor supply condition
are 2
1
cnt
= βEt
{
[1 + (1− τ)Rt+1 − δ] 1
cnt+1
}
(12)
hnt = 1−
Acnt
(1− τ)wt (13)
The Euler equation captures the idea that the optimizing household is indif-
ferent between consuming in time period t and t + 1. Thus, the left-hand side
of Equation (12) quantifies the utility loss of saving one unit of consumption
in t while the right-hand side amounts the utility gain in t + 1 of saving that
particular unit of consumption in time period t. The optimal labor supply con-
dition in (13) captures the relationship between consumption and labor supply
for every given real wage rate in time period t. Thus, the Euler equation is the
household’s inter-temporal optimality condition, while the labor supply decision
is referred to as intra-temporal optimality condition.
2.2.2 The representative migrant household
The identical utility maximization problem can be solved for the representative
migrant household. At date t, the representative migrant household maximizes
the following expected utility
max
{cmt ,hmt ,kmt+1}
Et
∞∑
t=0
βt {log(cmt ) +A log(1− hmt )} (14)
subject to
cmt + i
m
t = (1− τ) [wthmt +Rtkmt ]− tmt
kmt+1 = (1− δ)kmt + imt (15)
2See Appendix A.1 for the derivation of the first order conditions and calculations.
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Analogue to the native household, the solution to the migrant household’s prob-
lem can be summarized in the Euler equation and the optimal labor supply
conditions 3.
1
cmt
= βEt
{
[1 + (1− τ)Rt+1 − δ] 1
cmt+1
}
(16)
hmt = 1−
Acmt
(1− τ)wt (17)
2.2.3 Aggregation
In order to get aggregate variables, per native household variables and per
migrant household variables, respectively, have to be converted into a same unit.
This happens by using the definition of γt and (1 − γt). Multiplying the per
respective household variables by their relative share in the population yields to
aggregate migrant household variables and aggregate native household variables.
In a next step, the respective aggregate household variables are multiplied by
the size of total population Nt to get absolute aggregates for native households
and migrant households. An addition of those yields to aggregate variables.
Ct = Ntγtc
n
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cnt
+Nt(1− γt)cmt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cmt
(18)
Ht = Ntγth
n
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hnt
+Nt(1− γt)hmt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hmt
(19)
Kt = Ntγtk
n
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Knt
+Nt(1− γt)kmt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Kmt
(20)
Within this framework, labor migration does not affect household-specific per-
capita variables, since neither the variables x, γ nor N show up in the optimality
conditions of each household type. Thus, whenever the economy is hit by a pos-
itive government consumption shock, household-specific per-capita variables are
equally affected by it. Differences in the responses to the shock between the two
household types will only be observable in aggregate variables, i.e., either in the
aggregates of each household type or in aggregates of the total population as
defined in (18), (19) and (20).
3See Appendix A.1 for the derivation of the first order conditions and calculations for the
native household. The same calculations hold for the migrant household.
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Hence, the economy perceives an influx of additional migrant households as
an increase of the stock of identical migrant households who consume, work
and invest the same amount as the households already located in the economy.
Therefore, it is implicitly assumed that newcomers are endowed with the same
capital stock as the other households in the economy. In the case of emigration,
households bring their capital stock, which results in a reduction of the aggregate
(migrant) capital stock. However, the migrant per-capita capital stock remains
unchanged.
2.3 The representative firm
There is one representative firm that uses two input factors for production Yt;
aggregate labor expressed in working hours (Ht) and aggregate capital stock
(Kt). The production function is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale
to both input factors.
Yt = F (Kt, Ht) = K
α
t H
1−α
t (21)
Labor input is a CES-aggregate of native worker hours (Hnt ) and migrant worker
hours (Hmt ) with an elasticity of substitution of 1/ρ
4. Furthermore, it is as-
sumed that the labor market is always cleared, i.e., labor demand equals labor
supply which leads to zero unemployment in the economy.
Ht = F (H
n
t , H
m
t ) =
[
(Hnt )
1−ρ + (Hmt )
1−ρ] 11−ρ (22)
The elasticity of substitution between immigrant and native labor has been sub-
ject in the empirical field of research. For instance, Ottaviano and Peri (2012)
find a small but significant degree of imperfect substitutability between natives
and immigrant workers, i.e., ρ > 0. However, Borjas et al. (2008) show that
their finding of imperfect substitution is fragile due to heterogeneity in labor
market attachment among workers. However, controlling for this heterogene-
ity, the evidence for immigrant-native complementarity vanishes. Therefore, it
cannot be rejected that native and migrant workers with equal skill endowment
are perfect substitutes. Relying on (Borjas et al., 2008), I set ρ equal to zero
and assume perfect substitutability between migrant and native workers. This
simplifies Equation (22) to the following expression
4Note that the inverse of the elasticity of substitution is the elasticity of complementarity,
i.e., ρ.
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Ht = F (H
n
t , H
m
t ) = H
n
t +H
m
t (23)
Concerning the second input factor capital, both households own the aggre-
gate capital stock and rent it out to the representative firm. This leads to the
following maximization problem of the representative firm
max
{Ht,Kt}
Kαt H
1−α
t − wtHt −RtKt (24)
where wt is the real wage paid to the workers, Rt is the rental rate of capital,
and α is the capital share of income. The first order conditions of the firm’s
maximization problem are summarized below.
Kt : Rt = α
[
Kt
Ht
](α−1)
(25)
Ht : wt = (1− α)
[
Kt
Ht
]α
(26)
2.4 The government
The aim of the government in the economy is to stimulate economic activity
by a one time increase in government consumption. The government is forced
to balance its budget on a period-by-period basis. I assume that government
consumption is financed by distortionary as well as non-distortionary taxation.
I follow Baxter and King (1993) and do not explicitly consider the alternative of
debt financing here. Since the fiscal experiment that I analyze in the next section
is financed by an increase in the lump-sum tax rate, Ricardian equivalence holds.
Debt financing, when the tax rate is held constant, has the same implications
as financing government consumption by lump-sum taxation. Thus, the public
finance rule can be written as
τ(wtHt +RtKt) + Tt = Gt (27)
where Tt = Nt [γtt
n
t + (1− γt)tmt ]. Also, taxes are evenly distributed across
households, which leads to tn = tm in every time period t. Government con-
sumption, in deviation from its deterministic steady-state value, follows an ex-
ogenous stochastic AR(1)-process with persistence parameter ρG and t˜N(0, σ
2),
where G corresponds to the steady state of government consumption (Dupaigne,
2014).
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log(Gt) = (1− ρG) log(G) + ρG log(Gt−1) + t (28)
2.5 The equilibrium
2.5.1 The households
It is straightforward to transform both Euler equations to get two equilibrium
conditions for the economy. Plug in the factor prices Rt+1 into both Eulers
stated in (16) and (12).
1
cmt
= βEt
{
[1 + α(1− τ)
[
Kt+1
Ht+1
](α−1)
− δ] 1
cmt+1
}
(29)
1
cnt
= βEt
{
[1 + α(1− τ)
[
Kt+1
Ht+1
](α−1)
− δ] 1
cnt+1
}
(30)
(31)
Both labor supply conditions in (17) and (13) can be rewritten as
hmt = 1−
Acmt
(1− α)(1− τ)
[
Kt
Ht
]α (32)
hnt = 1−
Acnt
(1− α)(1− τ)
[
Kt
Ht
]α (33)
2.5.2 The resource constraint
The economy’s resource constraint is obtained by first expressing both house-
holds’ budget constraints into aggregate terms. Second, sum them as well as
the government budget constraint up and use Equations (18), (19) and (20) to
simplify the equations5. This leads to the following expression for the economy’s
resource constraint
Ct + It +Gt = Yt (34)
Equation (34) shows how total income/output is used in the economy. It is
divided between aggregate consumption, government consumption and invest-
ment.
5See Appendix A.2 for a detailed derivation of both households’ budget constraints in
aggregate per-capita terms as well as calculations that yield to the economy’s resource con-
straint.
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Now, given the initial position of the economy, a competitive equilibrium can
be defined as a sequence of prices {Rt, wt}∞t=0, taxes {τ, tnt , tmt }∞t=0, population
share {γ}∞t=0 and quantities {cnt , hnt , knt , cmt , hmt , kmt }∞t=0 such that:
1. Given factor prices {Rt, wt}∞t=0 and taxes {τ, tnt }∞t=0, the allocation {cnt , hnt , knt }∞t=0
solves the native household’s maximization problem in (10).
2. Given factor prices {Rt, wt}∞t=0 and taxes {τ, tmt }∞t=0, the allocation {cmt , hmt , kmt }∞t=0
solves the migrant household’s maximization problem in (14).
3. Given factor prices {Rt, wt}∞t=0, the allocation {Ht,Kt}∞t=0 solves the
firm’s maximization problem in (24)
4. Taxes {τ, Tt}∞t=0 are such that the government’s budget constraint in (27)
is satisfied.
5. All markets clear.
6. Total population evolves according to gpt =
Nn+xt+1(1−Nn)
Nn+xt(1−Nn) .
3 Calibration and multipliers
In order to solve the nonlinear stochastic general equilibrium model I use the
DYNARE implementation for Matlab which takes a first-order linear approx-
imation around the steady state. Following previous research as for instance
Gal´ı et al. (2007) or Riguzzi et al. (2014), I choose the variance of  in Equa-
tion (28) such that the increase in government consumption amounts to 1% of
steady-state output 6.
3.1 The steady state
The economy is assumed to initially be in steady state, in which all variables
(in per capita terms as well as in levels) are constant over time. Since in steady
state, x = YY = 1, there is no migration flowing into or out of the economy
which implies that the economy is closed in every respect. This implies that the
relative change of the population size defined in (7) simplifies to gpt = g
p = 1.
Since neither the native population nor the migrant population changes in the
6The shock’s standard deviation of 0.05 multiplied by 0.2, which is the fraction of output
that is dedicated to government consumption in steady state, then corresponds to a 1% of
steady-state output.
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steady state, the total population hence does not change neither. This means
that the shares, γ and (1 − γ) are also constant in steady state. Furthermore,
since both household types have an identical utility structure and face the same
factor prices they do not differ from one and another. All endogenous variables
in steady state can be expressed as functions of capital per hours worked K/H.
Due to the fact that the size of the population equals 1, aggregate variables
equal per-capita variables.
On a balanced growth path the return on capital, i.e., the interest rate is as-
sumed to be constant over time.
rt = (1− τ)Rt+1 − δ (35)
rt = α(1− τ)
[
Kt+1
Ht+1
]α−1
− δ (36)
Hence, if the left hand side of (36) is constant, the right hand side must also be
constant over all t. This is in line with Kaldor’s facts since
[
Kt+1
Ht+1
]α−1
= Yt+1Kt+1
is the capital-output ratio, which is constant on a balanced growth path.
r = α(1− τ) Y
K
− δ (37)
Imposing Kt/Ht = Kt+1/Ht+1 = K/H in the Euler equations for both house-
holds in (29) and (30), leads to the fact that consumption growth is also constant
over all t. However, since there is no growth within this framework, this leads to
equal consumption levels over all t, i.e. that cnt = c
n
t+1 = c
n and cmt = c
m
t+1 = c
m.
The value for K/H is obtained by solving one of the Eulers with respect to K/H.
K
H
=
[
α(1− τ)
1/β + δ − 1
] 1
1−α
(38)
The derivation of the remaining steady stats is straightforward. The steady-
state value for the factor prices can be written as
R = α
(
K
H
)α−1
=
[
1/β + δ − 1
(1− τ)
]
(39)
w = (1− α)
(
K
H
)α
= (1− α)
[
α(1− τ)
1/β + δ − 1
] α
1−α
(40)
Rewriting and dividing the resource constraint in (34) by Y , consumption-
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output ratio can be written as
C
Y
= 1− ω − δ
[
K
H
]1−α
(41)
= 1− ω − δ
[
α(1− τ)
1/β + δ − 1
]
(42)
Concerning the optimal labor supply of each household, the following relation-
ship holds 7.
H =
α(1− τ)[
α(1− τ) +ACY
] (43)
Due to the fact the variable that captures labor migration does not show up in
steady state, a numerical analysis is necessary to shed light on the dynamics of
the model when the economy developed above is hit by a shock to government
consumption.
3.2 Calibration
The calibration of the model is chosen to match U.S. data. I follow the calibra-
tion in Gal´ı et al. (2007) where each period is assumed to be a quarter. The
values are summarized in Table 1. The preference parameter A is chosen as
in Baxter and King (1993) such that households decide to work 20% of their
time in steady state 8. According to the Migration Policy Institute, the share
of foreign born in the U.S. population was 13% in 2013. To my knowledge the
value for the year 2013 is the most recent figure available, which I will therefore
use in my calibration. This leads to a steady-state γ of 0.87. When it comes
to the autoregressive parameter of government consumption, Gal´ı et al. (2007)
choose as benchmark value of 0.9, which matches the half-life of the responses
of government consumption. Hence, it reflects the relatively high persistence of
the government spending to its own shock.
7See Appendix A.3 for calculations.
8See Appendix A.4 for calculations.
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Table 1: Parameter values or ranges
Parameter Value Description
β 0.99 Subjective discount factor
A 3.5 Preference parameter
γ 0.87 initial share of native households
α 1/3 Total labor share of income
δ 0.025 Capital depreciation rate
ρG 0.9 Persistence parameter
τ 0.2 exogenous income tax rate
θ ∈ [0, 1] labor migration elasticity
Due to lack of suitable data, the labor migration elasticity θ is arbitrarily set
and ranges between 0 and 1, where θ = 0 describes a closed economy, in which
labor migration is ruled out. When θ = 1, labor migration reacts perfectly elas-
tic to a change in output relative to its steady-state value. It is important to
keep in mind when interpreting the results later that θ is an arbitrary number.
In order to get an idea how much the size of the migrant population within
an economy changes in reality, I examine data on the stock of foreign-born
population in the U.S. between 1994 and 2013 (OECD, 2015). Between those
years, the stock of foreign-born population continuously increased apart from
1999 and 2008 when there was a negative change relative to the previous year.
The average annual %-change amounts to approximately 3.6%, i.e., 0.88% in
per average quarter terms. Remember though that this value includes all kinds
of migration flows that influence the stock of foreign-born in the U.S. and not
only work-related migration as it is the case in the model studied here. Thus,
0.88% is used as upper-bound threshold for the simulated relative percentage
change of the stock of migrant households. However, even though the simulated
percentage change may be below that threshold, this does not directly imply
that the results found are economically meaningful, since it is still unclear how
much the simulated percentage change of the migrant population must be below
that threshold. Thus, any finding on the size of the fiscal multiplier must be
treated as suggestive rather than authoritative result.
Table 2 summarizes the steady-state values for the endogenous variables. Fol-
lowing Gal´ı et al. (2007) I set steady-state government consumption to 20% of
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steady-state output, which roughly corresponds to the average share of govern-
ment expenditures in postwar U.S. data. This implies a steady-state income tax
level of 0.2 when assuming that the steady-state lump-sum taxes equal zero.
Table 2: Steady-state values
Variable Value Description
k/h 20.94 Aggregate capital-labor ratio
R 0.04 Real interest rate
w 1.84 Real wage
c/y 0.61 Aggregate consumption-output ratio
h 0.2 Per-capita hours worked
k 4.19 Capital stock
y 0.55 Output level
g 0.11 Government consumption level
c 0.34 Private consumption level
3.3 Fiscal multiplier
The fiscal multiplier quantifies the effect on economic output from a fiscal ex-
pansion. Thus, if an increase of 1 unit in government consumption causes an
increase of aggregate output by 0.5 units, the resulting multiplier amounts to
0.5. I follow Ilzetzki et al. (2013) for the calculation of two different types of
the fiscal multiplier. The impact multiplier describes the immediate impact of
the increase in government consumption on aggregate output, whereas the cu-
mulative multiplier depicts the effect of the change in government consumption
over a longer forecast horizon T .
Impact multiplier =
∆Yt
∆Gt
(44)
Cumulative multiplier =
∑T
t=1 ∆Yt∑T
t=1 ∆Gt
(45)
Typically, the cumulative multiplier is larger than the impact multiplier due to
the fact that there may be lags in the effects (Spilimbergo et al., 2009; Chinn,
2013). Thus, if for example the maximum effect on output occurs in some
periods after the shock actually has hit the economy, the impact multiplier
results to be smaller than the cumulative multiplier evaluated at the time period
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where output is affected the most relative too all other periods considered in
the analysis. Within the framework chosen here, the impact multiplier is always
larger than the cumulative multiplier evaluated at any other time period because
the effect of an increase in government consumption on output results to be
largest at impact. I list plots that show impact as well as cumulative multipliers
for different θ in the Appendix 10.
4 Results
In the present section, I analyze the effects of a 1% increase in government con-
sumption of steady-state output in the economy described above. The focus
particularly lies on the influence of the labor mobility parameter θ. It is to find
out how sensitive the impact multiplier is with respect to the responsiveness of
labor migration to a positive government consumption shock.
The impact multiplier in Equation (44) can be rewritten since the simulated
temporary and exogenous shock to government consumption amounts to 1% of
steady-state output 9.
Impact multiplier =
∆Yt
∆Gt
= 100 · Yt − Y
Y
(46)
Within this framework, the impact multiplier can be interpreted as just the
relative change of aggregate output times the inverse of the exogenous shock
to government consumption. Figure 1 summarizes impact multipliers with dif-
ferent values for the migration elasticity θ, ranging from 0 to 1. The positive
relationship between the impact multiplier and the migration elasticity sup-
ports the idea that relatively more responsive labor mobility induces a higher
effectiveness of fiscal policy. To find a plausible explanation for this positive
relationship, an inspection of the impulse response functions of the variables
is necessary. Furthermore, it will give instructive information on the different
transition mechanisms that lead to that result.
9See Appendix A.5 for calculations.
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Figure 1: The relationship between impact multiplier and labor migration elas-
ticity.
Figures 2a and 2b show impulse response functions of aggregate variables to
the government consumption shock with θ = 0 and θ = 1, respectively. The
impulse responses of the variables seem to look quite similar in both figures. In
both cases output and labor supply jump up to a certain level and eventually
converge back to their steady state levels. These positive responses of output
and labor supply are expected. A change in government consumption financed
by and increase in lump-sum taxes has a negative wealth effect on households
since households’ income reduces by the same amount as the increase in gov-
ernment consumption. This negative wealth effect leads to an increase in labor
supply at any given real wage in order to increase labor income that is supposed
to cover the increase in their tax burden. Higher labor supply translates into
higher labor demand which in turn yields to an increase in output. Due to the
negative wealth effect, households not only reduce leisure but also consumption,
which is confirmed by the impulse response function of aggregate private con-
sumption. Also aggregate investment is crowded out and decreases at impact
before it converges back to its initial steady state.
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(a) θ = 0 (b) θ = 1
Figure 2: Impulse responses functions of aggregate variables.
Even though, the inspection of these figures may have helped to get an instruc-
tive idea what happens in the economy after a government consumption shock
depending on the degree of the labor migration elasticity, it is still unclear what
makes fiscal policy more effective in presence of labor mobility. In a next step,
impulse response functions of labor supply, investment and consumption for
θ = 0 and θ = 1 are compared in order to see how these differ depending on the
size of θ.
4.1 Labor supply
Figure 3 shows the difference in the responsiveness of aggregate labor supply
depending on the size of θ. The responsiveness of labor supply with labor migra-
tion is higher than without labor migration. Since there is no unemployment in
the economy, an increase in total population due to the arrival of new migrant
households leads immediately to an increase in the labor force. A difference be-
tween the impulse response functions of migrant per-capita labor supply would
imply that households would take into account that there are more households
supplying labor and would therefore adjust their supply of work hours. Since
this is not the case, an adjustment of the intensive margin due to labor migra-
tion can be ruled out. No matter if there is labor migration or not, households’
labor supply response to the positive government consumption shock remains
the same. This makes sense since each household experiences the same increase
in taxes and therefore increases labor supply in the same way. This leads to the
conclusion that the difference in the responsiveness of the aggregate labor sup-
ply only arises from the increase in the extensive margin, i.e., more households
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in the economy means more labor supplied, nevertheless at the same optimal
level of hours per person as without labor migration.
Figure 3: Imulse response function of aggregate labor supply depending on θ.
4.2 Investment
Inspecting the two impulse response functions in Figure 4, leads to the observa-
tion that aggregate investment responds relatively less negative in the presences
of labor migration than without. The crowding-out effect on investment is mit-
igated through the positive effect on the migrant capital stock enhanced by
the arrival of additional households. See the impulse response functions of the
individual households’ capital stocks in Figure 8 in the Appendix. While ag-
gregate migrant capital stock jumps from its steady state at impact and from
there decreases due to the increase in the real interest rate, native capital stock
remains at its steady-state level at impact and decreases from there. However,
both capital stocks recover and eventually find back to their steady states.
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Figure 4: Imulse response function of aggregate investment depending on θ.
4.3 Consumption
Similar to the response of aggregate investments, aggregate consumption instan-
taneously decreases below its steady-level and converges back to its initial steady
state. However, the negative effect on consumption is mitigated by the inflow
of migrant households. Aggregate migrant consumption increases at first due
to the fact that the share of migrant households in total population increases.
However, the positive effect on aggregate migrant consumption is of short dura-
tion. Newcomer households perceive the negative wealth effect of the increase
in government consumption straight away and decrease their consumption in
order to cope with the relatively higher tax burden.
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Figure 5: Imulse response function of aggregate consumption depending on θ.
Thus, there is less crowding out of private consumption as well as investment in
the presence of labor mobility. Newcomers enhance higher aggregate consump-
tion as well as higher aggregate investment at arrival to the economy which
mitigates the negative wealth effect of the increased tax burden. This implies
that relatively more labor as well as capital is available for the representative
firm to use for production. Therefore, also output happens to be relatively
higher than in a closed economy scenario.
Therefore, the implications of labor mobility, as it is modeled here, leads to a
relatively larger impact multiplier because of the mitigating effects of a larger
population on the crowding out of private consumption and investment. How-
ever, for this to be an economically meaningful result, it is necessary to make
sure that the arbitrarily chosen range for θ produces reasonable changes in the
population. If the effect of the government consumption shock on the size of
total population is too large, then the mitigating effect on the crowding out of
private consumption and investment results to be unreasonably large which in
turn leads to an unreasonably large effect on output. The result of a higher
effectiveness of fiscal policy in the presence of labor mobility may not be an
economically meaningful but rather a random result that crucially depends on
the choice of θ. To reduce that risk impulse response functions of the labor
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migration variable x is analyzed and the relative percentage change of the stock
of migrant households is calculated.
Table 3 summarizes the changes of the stock of migrant households relative to
the initial size of 0.13. The impulse responses of xt suggest that the increase
in the size of the migrant population in the shock period lies between 0.04%
when θ = 0.1 and 0.5% when θ = 1 . This result seems fairly plausible when
comparing it to 0.88%. However, even though all values lie below real data,
it is unclear how close to reality the simulations are since it is unknown how
large in average the fraction of employment-related migrants in the total stock
is. Therefore, it is very important that the results are interpreted with caution.
Table 3: Effect on the stock of migrant households
θ Stock size at impact relative %-change
0.1 13005.76 0.044%
0.2 13011.66 0.090%
0.3 13017.70 0.136%
0.4 13023.90 0.184%
0.5 13030.25 0.233%
0.6 13036.77 0.283%
0.7 13043.46 0.334%
0.8 13050.32 0.387%
0.9 13057.37 0.441%
1 13064.61 0.497%
Notes: The size of the stock is scaled up by 100′000 to
facilitate the reading. %-change is relative to the steady-
state stock size of 13′000.
The results from the simulation of a 1% shock to government consumption, sug-
gest that a higher labor migration elasticity leads to a higher effectiveness of
expansionary fiscal policy. Also, the difference between the size of the multi-
plier increases as the elasticity increases. Thus, between the arbitrarily chosen
range of [0, 1] for θ, the relationship between the impact multiplier and the la-
bor migration elasticity is convex. This makes sense since the more elastic the
labor migration with respect to the deviation of economic activity to its steady
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state, the more labor as well as the more capital flow into the economy, which in
turn translates into relatively more output. The simulated changes in the stock
of migrant households result to be in a plausible range, which may indicate an
economically meaningful relationship between international labor migration and
the effectiveness of fiscal policy. However, for this result to have future policy
implications further research is needed in order to figure out how plausible the
simulated changes in stock of migrant households are.
5 Conclusion
The aim of this thesis was to find out whether differences in the labor migration
elasticity lead to economically meaningful differences in the size of the fiscal
multiplier. In order to do so, I constructed a real business cycle model with
native and migrant households that only differ in their ability to move across
economies. The findings support the hypothesis that a higher labor migration
elasticity leads to a larger fiscal multiplier. The reason why the size of the
impact multiplier is larger is because the crowding out of aggregate private con-
sumption and investment caused by a 1 % increase in government consumption
are mitigated by initial increases of aggregate migrant consumption as well as
aggregate migrant investment. However, the question whether the differences
in the size of the fiscal multipliers are economically meaningful has not a clear
answer. Even though the simulated changes in the migrant population lie in a
plausible range, it is not certain if these simulated changes match the changes
in the data. The differences in the size of the multipliers are only economically
meaningful if they match. Thus, it needs further research to find out if inter-
national labor migration is a determinant of the size of fiscal multipliers. The
results only suggest the possibility for labor mobility to be a determinant of the
effectiveness of fiscal policy.
Having this in mind, it would be really interesting for future research to investi-
gate further about possible implications of international labor mobility on fiscal
policy outcomes. A good starting point for future research would be to answer
the question if the simulated changes in the stock of migrant households match
changes in the stock of work-related migrant households in the data. Due to the
fact that the model developed here includes relatively basic features of an econ-
26
omy, it would be interesting to see how the results would change if more realistic
features would be modeled. For instance, Ferriere and Navarro (2014) suggests
that the assumption of indivisible labor allows to break the tight link between
government consumption, private consumption and hours worked, which implies
a milder reaction of aggregate private consumption for a given increase in labor.
Within the framework of this thesis, indivisible labor may lead to a even milder
crowding out of private consumption. Furthermore, choosing a new Keynesian
framework that includes wage as well as price rigidities in order to analyze and
understand the relationship between labor mobility and fiscal policy outcomes
would be interesting as well.
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A Calculations
A.1 The representative native household’s maximization
problem
The natives’ Lagrangian and the first order conditions can be written as
L = Et
∞∑
t=0
βt {log(cnt ) +A log(1− hnt )} −
∞∑
t=0
λt
{
cnt + k
n
t+1 − (1− δ)knt
−(1− τ) [wthnt −Rtknt ] + tnt }
cnt : β
t 1
cnt
= λt (47)
hnt : β
t A
(1− hnt )
= (1− τ)wtλt (48)
knt+1 : λt = Et {λt+1 [1 + (1− τ)Rt+1 − δ]} (49)
In order to get to the inter-temporal Euler equation use Equation (47) in (49).
βt
1
cnt
= Et
{
βt+1
1
cnt+1
[1 + (1− τ)Rt+1 − δ]
}
⇔
1
cnt
= βEt
{
[1 + (1− τ)Rt+1 − δ] 1
cnt+1
}
The intra-temporal labor supply condition of the native household is achieved
by dividing (48) by (47).
Acnt
(1− hnt )
= (1− τ)wt
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A.2 The resource constraint
Before the individual budget constraints as well as the finance rule of the govern-
ment can be aggregated, they individual budget constraints have to be trans-
formed such that they are expressed in the same unit. Remember that the
individual budget constraints hold for one native household and one migrant
household, respectively. Since only one person lives in every household, the
budget constraints are expressed in per migrant capita and per native capita,
respectively. Thus, multiply the variables by their respective share of total pop-
ulation to express the variables in aggregate per-capita terms. Multiplying them
by the size of total population Nt leads to variables in aggregate terms. Note
that the budget constraint of the government stated in (27) is already expressed
in aggregate terms. Afterwards, all three constraints summed up will eventually
lead to the resource constraint of the whole economy.
The native household
Remember the native budget constraint per native household from Equation
(11)
cnt + k
n
t+1 = (1− δ)kt + (1− τt) [wthnt +Rtknt ]− tnt
Multiply the variables by the share of the native household in total population
and the size of total population Nt.
Ntγtc
n
t +Ntγtk
n
t+1 = (1− δ)Ntγtknt + (1− τt)Ntγt [wthnt +Rtknt ]− γtNttnt ⇔
Cnt +K
n
t+1 = (1− δ)Knt + (1− τt) [wtHnt +RtKnt ]− Tnt
The migrant household
Remember the migrant budget constraint from Equation (15)
cmt + k
m
t+1 = (1− δ)kmt + (1− τ) [wthmt +Rtkmt ]− tmt
Analogue to the derivation of the native household’s budget constraint in ag-
gregate terms, multiply both sides by the share of the migrant household in the
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economy (1− γt) as well as by Nt.
Nt(1− γt)cmt +Nt(1− γt)kmt+1 = (1− δ)Nt(1− γt)kmt
+(1− τ)Nt(1− γt) [wthmt +Rtkmt ]−Nt(1− γt)tmt ⇔
Cmt +K
m
t+1 = (1− δ)Kmt + (1− τ) [wtHmt +RtKmt ]− Tmt
Aggregation
Remember that the government budget constraint is defined as τ(wtHt+RtKt)+
Tt = Gt. Then, summing up the three budget constraints yields to the following
expression and using the expressions in (18), (19) and (20) for Ct, Ht and Kt
yields to the following
Cnt + C
m
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ct
+Knt+1 +K
m
t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Kt+1
+Gt = (1− δ) (Knt +Kmt )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Kt
+(1− τ)
wt (Hnt +Hmt )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ht
+Rt (K
n
t +K
m
t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Kt

Rearranging and plugging in the firms’ first order conditions for Rt and wt.
Ct + It +Gt = Yt
where It = Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt and Yt = Kαt H1−αt .
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A.3 The steady state
To get to the steady-state value for the labor supply rewrite the optimal labor
supply condition in either (17) or (13), skip the superscripts and plug in the
steady-state value for the real wage in (40). Eventually, solve for h. Note that
in steady state the size of total population equals 1, which leads to the fact the
aggregate variables equal per-capita variables.
H = 1− AC
(1− τ)w = 1−
AC
(1− α)(1− τ) YH
= 1− AH
C
Y
(1− α)(1− τ)
(1− α)(1− τ)H = (1− α)(1− τ)−AhC
Y
(1− α)(1− τ)H +AHC
Y
= (1− α)(1− τ)
H
[
(1− α)(1− τ) +AC
Y
]
= (1− α)(1− τ)
H =
(1− α)(1− τ)[
(1− α)(1− τ) +ACY
]
A.4 Calibration
The preference parameter A is calculated from the steady-state labor supply
in (43), assuming that H = 0.2 and the steady-state government consumption
share of income is defined as ω.
H =
(1− α)(1− τ)[
(1− α)(1− τ) +ACY
]
H
[
(1− α)(1− τ) +A
(
1− ω − δ
[
K
H
]1−α)]
= (1− α)(1− τ)
HA
(
1− ω − δ
[
K
H
]1−α)
= (1− α)(1− τ)−H(1− α)(1− τ)
A =
(1− α)(1− τ)(1−H)
H
(
1− ω − δ [KH ]1−α)
A = 3.5045
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A.5 Fiscal multipliers
The impact multiplier can be rewritten as
∆Yt
∆Gt
=
Yt − Yt−1
G1 −Gt−1 =
Yt − Y
G1 −G
=
Yt − Y
(0.2Y + 0.01Y )− 0.2Y =
Yt − Y
0.01Y
= 100 · Yt − Y
Y
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B Figures
B.1 Impulse response functions
Figure 6: Impulse responses of the population variables,
where θ = 1.
Figure 7: Impulse responses of factor prices, where θ =
1.
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Figure 8: Impulse responses of aggregate consumption, labor
supply and capital stock for both type of households, where
θ = 1.
Figure 9: Impulse responses of per-capita consumption, labor
supply and capital stock for both type of households.
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B.2 Fiscal multipliers
(a) θ = 0.1
(b) θ = 0.5
(c) θ = 1
Figure 10: Impact multiplier and cumulative multiplier for different θ.
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